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for this but, given that only 53% of those who declined the opportunity to make
a statement were similarly content with their decision at the same point in the
process, 28 it seems fair to say that victims, those whom the scheme was designed
to benefit, had gained from being offered the chance. Even a majority of respondents
who described making the statement as upsetting (20/34) found that, overall, going
through that process made them feel better.2 Again, the evidence from the evaluation
indicates that victims want primarily to be kept informed rather than to influence the
outcome of the case.30 Accordingly, if victim statements only cause a small ripple in
the waters of fairness to the accused, rather than the expected tidal wave, and if,
at the same time, they increase, even minimally, victim satisfaction with the criminal
process, there are clear benefits in rolling the scheme out nationwide. The evaluation's
authors are to be commended for a balanced piece of research on which such a
conclusion could be based. The Scottish Government is still considering their findings
and has not yet determined whether the scheme should be extended or not.
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Classification of Delictual Damages - Harding v
Wealands and the Rome II Regulation
In Scottish - or English or Northern Irish - private international law, damages have
traditionally been regarded as a mixture of substance and of procedure. Although
it is difficult to draw a dividing line, it has generally been agreed that the heads of
damage are an issue of substance and should be governed by the lcx causae, while the
quantification of damages is an issue of procedure and should be decided according
to the lexfori.2 However, the division between substance and procedure is not clear-
cut. Whether ceilings on damage awards are covered under the "heads of damage" or
the "quantification of damages" is particularly controversial. These issues have been
examined in a number of recent English cases. 3 The latest decision, by the House
of Lords in Harding v Wealands,4 might have been expected to be the last word.
28 Para 6.65; table 6.27.
29 Para 6.48.
30 Para 6.79.
31 http://www.scotland.gov.ik/Topir s/Jo stice/criminal/1 8244/1706 8/7188
1 1lcElroy v McAllister 1949 SC 11(1 at 133 per Lord Keith Boys r Chaplin [1971] AC 356 at 379 per
Lord Hodson.
2 Dicey, Morris and Collins: Conflict of Las, 14 th edn, by L Collins et al (2006) paras 7-035, 35-053.
3 Edmunds v Sinootonds [2001] 1 WLR 1003; Rocrig v Valiant Trawlers Ltd 12002] 1 XX LR 2304; Hulse v
Chambers [2001] 1 WLR 2386.
4 [2006] UKHL 32, [2007] 2 AC 1.
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However, despite the high status and careful exposition of a unanimous decision, its
importance is greatly limited by new European legislation. Contrary to the existing
Scottish (English) rules, the Rome II Regulation provides that the assessment of
damages or remedy claimed is governed by the Icx causae.5
A. HARDING v WEALANDS
(1) The facts
In Hardin- vr Wealands, the claimant, Mr Harding, an Englishman, was rendered
tetraplegic following an accident in New South Wales caused by the defendant,
Ms Wealands, an Australian national. Mr Harding brought an action in England
and Ms Wealands conceded liability. Under the law of New South Wales, the
Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 imposes a restriction on the damages
for injuries suffered in motor accidents. There is no such restriction in English
law. It was unanimously agreed in the Court of Appeal,' and not questioned in
the House of Lords, that the applicable law on the substance was the law of
New South Wales. In the Court of Appeal the question came down to the classification
of assessment of delictual damages. If this was classified as a question of substance,
the law of New South Wales law applied, to the advantage of the defendant; if it was
classified as procedure, English law applied, to the advantage of the claimant. A
majorit-, of the Court of Appeal decided that assessment of damages was an issue
of substance. The House of Lords unanimously held that assessment of damages is
procedural, that a cap on damages is an issue of assessment of damages, and therefore
that English law applies to that issue as the lexfori.
(2) The issues
In delivering the leading speech, Lord Hoffmann considered the old choice of
law cases, and concluded that the traditional rule regarded matters of remedy as
procedure which is governed by the lex foci. 7 This common law approach had not
been affected by part III of the Private International Law (,Miscellaneous Provisions)
Act 1995. s Lord Hoffmann then concluded that statutory ceilings on damages
are matters of procedure rather than substance. 9 Although a report by the Law
Commissions on Choice of Laic in Tort and Delict had stated that "a statutory ceiling
on damages is a substantive issue for the applicable law in tort or delict rather than a
5 Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the law applicable to
non-contractual obligations (Rome II), oJ 2007 L199/40, art 15(c).
6 [2005] 1 All ER 415.
7 [2007] 2 AC 1 at para 24.
8 Paras 31-38. See the similar reasoning of Lord Rodger at paras 62-69. Only Lord Carswell, at paras
79-83, felt it necessary to rely on a statement to this effect in the House of Lords during the passage of
the Act by Lord Mackay of Clashfem, then Lord Chancellor.
9 Paras 39-53. On the question of whether a cap on damages is a matter of procedure Lord Woolf
(para 10) conceded that the answer was not "obvious', while Lord Hoffmann (para 51) hinted that it
might not be the best result but that his job was to preserse the common law nile that "Parliament
intended to preserve" bv the 1995 Act,
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procedural issue for the lexfori",10 Lord Hoffmann saw this as inconsistent with the
view in the same report that no changes should be brought to the common law rules
on the question of damages." Since the common law classifies all matters relating to
remedies as procedure, this basic principle should apply.
The House of Lords' reasoning is controversial. The substance-procedure line in
the common law is ambiguous and unclear. As Lord Pearson said in Boys U: Chaplin,
"I do not think there is any exact and authoritative definition of the boundary betaeen
substantive law and procedural (or adjectival or non-substantive) law".12 There is no
doubt that in the 1995 Act Parliament intended assessment of damages to continue to
be classified as procedure. However, there is nothing in Lord Mackay's statemcnt, or
elsewhere in the travaux preparatoires, to indicate that caps on damages fell within
assessment of damages. Hence the Law Commissions' statement - following on from
Dicey's view that "statutory provisions limiting a defendant's liability are prima facie
substantive; but the true construction of the statute may negative this view" 13 _ creates
a strong case for believing that Parliament would have thought that caps on damages
were classified as substance.
(3) The effects
In adopting a wide definition of procedure, the House of Lords employed a strict
reading both of the legislative text and of the pre-1995 common law. Even if Harding
is correct in law, the appropriateness of this broad classification of procedure seems
questionable as a matter of policy.
First of all, it may not be fair to apply different laws to the existence of liability
and to the remedy. If a cause of action is unknown in Scotland but exists in the
lex causae, it is hard to use Scots law to assess damages.' 4 In other cases, the lex
Caustc may adopt strict liability but at the same time introduces a limitation to the
remedy in order to provide a reasonable balance,' 5 while in the lex foci liability may
be based on negligence or even fault, with higher damages being awarded to reflect
the higher level of wrongdoing. It is unfair for the defender to be subject both to the
strict liability of the lex causae and to the higher damages of the lexfori.
Secondly, it may be argued that the rule fails to observe the fuiction of the
applicable law and the lex foci.16 The main rationale for classifing an issue as
10 Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Report on Pitat' International Lair: Choice of Lair
in Tort and Delict (Law Coin No 193, Scot Law Con No 129, 1990) para 3.39. See also Dicey and
Morris Conflict of Law', 13th edn, )x L Collins et al (2000) para 35-055.
11 Report on Private International Laie para 3,38.
12 [1971] AC 356 at 395.
13 This first appeared in the 7
th edition of Dicey's Conflict of Laws (ed J H C Morns, 1958) 1092,
md was still in the editions which were current at the time of the Law Commissions' Report
(11ih edn, bx L Collins et al (1987) 188) and of the 1995 Act (12"h edn, by L Collins et al (1993) 184).
Lord Hoffmann does a careful job of analysing the cases on which the proposition in Dicey was based
and concludes (paras 42-48) that it "was too ssideh stated" and had no application to tort rather than
contract damages.
14 Dicey, Morris & Collins (n 2) para 35-056.
15 C Dougherty and L WrNies, "Hardiii v Wealands'" (2007) 56 ICLQ 443 at 452.
16 P Rogerson, "Quantification of damages - substance or procedure?" (2006) 65 CLJ 515 at 516-517.
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procedure, thus bringing in the lexfori, is convenience.'17 However, there is no reason
why applying the foreign law to assess damages should cause more inconvenience
than applying the foreign law to decide whether a tort is actionable in the first
place. 18
Thirdly, it is doubtful whether this classification is up-to-date or whether it is
compatible with the current practice in the world'9 or in other areas of Scots law. The
Rome Convention, which has been implemented by the Contracts (Applicable Law)
Act 1990, provides that the assessment of damages, insofar as governed by rules of law,
is governed by the lex causae.2o This ambiguous provision separates the assessment
of damages into t-Wo categories, namely the rules of law and the questions of fact. The
first category, which surely covers statutory restrictions on damages, is classified as
substance and governed by the lex cao sae.21
Fourthly, the inclusion of statutory restrictions on damages as procedure makes the
scope of procedure unreasonably wide. The classification can be seen as a parochial
device to limit the effects of the lex causae by extending the application of the
lex fori,2 2 when, as Anton notes, "the constant aim of the Scottish courts should
be to restrict" the domain of procedure. "To classify a foreign rule as procedural is to
except it from its normal application in Scotland and, on general principles, exceptions
are to be strictly interpreted."-23
Fifthly, the current approach may open the door for forum shopping, especially
when discretion to decline jurisdiction has been largely barred by the European
jurisdiction system. 2 4
B. ROME II REGULATION
About twelve months after the decision in Harding u Wealands, the Rome II
Regulation was adopted by the Council of the European Union and approved by the
17 See Anton's test of applying the foreign rules unless it is "impracticable" to do so within the terms
of Scottish procedures: see Priuate International Law, 1I edn (1967) 542. See also Roerig v Valiant
Tr'aulri Ltd [2002] 1 VI1 2304 at para 26 per Waller LJ; J Carrnthers, "Substance and procedure in
the conflict of laws a continuing debate in relation to damages" (2004) 5:3 ICLQ 691 at 692;
C NI V Clarkson and J Hill, The Conflict of Lars, 3 'd edn (2006) 470.
IS Lord Woolf points out in Harding (para 11) that the Nes South Wales Act has "prosisions which it
wonld be vet difficult, if not impossible, to apply in proceedings brought in this country'.
19 See the shifts away from the traditional English approach on treating assessment of damages as pro-
cedund in Canada and Australia, acknowledged by Lord Rodger in Harding (para 69) as "'ammunition,
or food for thought, for critics of the pohc adopted iy Parliament in the 1995 Act".
20 Art 10(l)(c).
21 NI Giuliano and P Lagarde, Report on the Conention on the law applicable to conitractual obligations,
OJ 1980 C281 33' Dicey, to-is & Colimis' (n2)para 32-301; Chesh'ire amid North: Privatc Intemational
Law. 13th edn, I) P NI North and J J Fawcett (1999) 88 Clarkson & Hill, Conflict of Laws (n 17) 469-
470, Dougherty & NVsles (n 15) at 451.
22 G Panagopoulos, "Substance and procedure in private international law" (2005) 1 Journal of Prirate
International Lai 69 at 71.
23 A E Anton, Private Interiational Law 1st edn (1967) 542, in stark contrast to the tendency in England
to give a broad construction to procedure: see Panagopoulos (n 22) at 71.
24 See Panagopoulos (n 22) at 71; Harding u Wealaids [2007] 2 AC 1 at para 64 per Lord Rodger; Case
C- 128/01 Owus i Jackson [2005] ECR I- 1:383.
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European Parliament.2 It will apply from 11 January 2009, replacing the national
choice of law rules in non-contractual obligations which fall within its scope. Like the
traditional Scottish (and English) rules, the Rome II Regulation divides substance
and procedure, and leaves the issue of procedure to the law of the forum. 26 However,
it further provides that "the existence, the nature and the assessment of damages or
remedy claimed" should be governed by the lex causae.27 No guidance is provided as
to what constitutes "the assessment of damages or remedy claimed", but the words
used are wide enough to cover all matters relating to damages, including what have
been traditionally classified as procedural issues in Scotland. Under the Rome II
Regulation the issue of damages is no longer a mixture of substance and procedure,
but a unitary package, which is classified as "substance" and governed by the
1ex causae. As a result, the importance of Harding c Wcalands has been greatly
limited.
(1) Observations on the Rome II classification
The Rome II Regulation overturns the highly controversial rules in the UK.
By classifying 'all matters relating to damages as substantive, it adopts a narrow
definition of "procedure", which is compatible with the practice in most of continental
Europe. As already mentioned, it is not the best solution to classify assessment of
damages as procedure. In addition, there are both theoretical and pragmatic reasons
to classify remedies as substance. First of all, the remedy is an inseparable part of the
right.28 The restriction of assessment of damages can be regarded as a restriction of
the right itself
Secondly, applying the lex causae to both the heads and the assessment of damages
is more desirable for the purposes of private international law. The function of choice
of law is to select a law that is "most appropriate" to decide a dispute. The 'x causae
should have a wide scope of application and only in exceptional circumstances should
its effect be declined. While the lex fori is often an "'appropriate" system of Las to
govern a dispute, this is not always the case because exorbitant rules of jurisdiction still
exist and because an acceptable basis of jurisdiction, such as the defender's domicile,
is not usually as appropriate a law to govern a delictual dispute as the law of the place
of damage (the main rule in article 4 of Rome II).
Thirdly, the unitary solution provided by the Rome II Regulation avoids the vexed
issue of how to draw a line between substance and procedure within damages. In
most cases the lines between the heads of damage, the remoteness of damage, and
the assessment of damage are vague. There are a number of borderline issues in
addition to ceilings and floors of damages.
25 n 5.
26 Art 1(3).
27 Art 15(c).
28 Panagopoulos (n 22) at 77.
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(2) Some problems
Although the Rome II Regulation brings simplicity and clarity into a traditionally
vexed area, certain new problems are also created. One of the reasons that the UK
Parliament classified the assessment of damages as procedure and applied the lexfori
was to avoid excessive awards of damages. In the debate on the 1995 Act, the Lord
Chancellor, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, warned against bringing "American scales of
compensation into English courts".29 The lex causae may award punitive damages or
even just levels of damages classified as compensatory but at excessively high levels
by Scottish standards. By classifying assessment of damages as a matter of substance,
the Rome II Regulation creates the possibility that Scottish courts will have to make
extremely high damages awards when applying certain foreign laws. The difference
between two legal systems on the assessment of damages will not be considered
excessive or unendurable in most cases. However, when this difference is so extreme
that it would be contrary to the fundamental policy or public interest of the forum,
the forum should be able to find a way to reduce the level of damages awarded to a
level consistent with its public policy.
The public policy exception in the Rome II Regulation has to be read in the light
of recital :32. It provides that:
the application of a provision of the law designated by this Regulation which would have the
effect of causing non-compensatory exemplar\, or punitive damages of an excessive nature
to be awarded may, depending on the circumstances of the case and the legal order of
the Member State of the court seised, be regarded as being contrary to the public policy
(ordre public) of the forum.
This recital is drafted in a way that seeks to avoid the European Court of Justice giving
a uniform interpretation of when excessive damages are contrary to public policy by
saying that the issue is not only case-specific but also varies depending on the "legal
order of the Member State of the court seised". Part of the sensitivity here is that
several legal systems in the EU award exemplary or punitive damages in certain cases.
Thus it was unacceptable to categorise all exemplary or punitive damages as contrary
to public policy but only "excessive" damages in those categories. A telling omission
from the recital is the idea that public policy could be used to reduce damages awards
that are compensatory under the lex causae but excessively beyond the amount that
the lex fori would regard as necessar' to compensate the victim. This might lead
courts to classify the part of a damages award they believe to be excessive as exemplary
or punitive even though it would be classified as compensatory by the lex causae. This
is an unfortunate temptation to keep playing the classification game.
Another problem with applying the lex causae to assessment of damages is that the
awards might be much lower than under the lexfori. This might result in those living
in the forumn receiving inadequate compensation because the higher costs in that
jurisdiction are not anticipated by the applicable law.30 The European Parliament,
29 Quoted in Harding r \Vealands [2007] 2 AC 1 at para 37.
:30 Lord Rodger highlights this problern in Harding v W alands [2007] 2 AC 1 at para 70.
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concerned about this problem in the context of traffic accidents, introduced recital
33 providing as follows:
According to the current national rules on compensation awarded to victims of road traffic
accidents, when quantifying damages for personal injury in cases in which the accident
takes place in a State other than that of the habitual residence of the \ictim, the court
seised should take into account all the relevant actual circumstances of the specific victim,
including in particular the actual losses and costs of after-care and medical attention.
31
The problem with this recital is that it does not link to any substantive provision
of the Regulation. It attempts to say what national substantive law should do, whereas
the Regulation only helps to determine which law applies to the dispute and not what
the content of that law should be.
(3) Some exceptions
The Rome II Regulation provides a different classification for the assessment of
damages than the prior Scots law However, some non-contractual obligations,
notably defamation and other privacy-related delicts, are excludedf 2 and the Harding
classification will continue to apply. This means that, while the assessment of damages
will be classified as substance and governed by the applicable law in most delictual
cases, such as traffic accidents, product liability, and environmental damages, in
cases such as defamation the assessment of damages will continue to be classified as
procedure. It is doubtful whether such mixed and inconsistent rules are appropriate
in the future, and the UK legislatures should think carefully about the best solution in
areas outside the scope of Rome II when repealing part III of the 1995 Act. However,
the political lobby that ensured defamation was outwith the scope of Rome I is likely
to prevent the extension of the Rome II rules by UK legislation.
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The Scottish Parliament Elections 2007 - what kind
of hackery is this?*
To put electoral law at the front and centre of popular discourse is no mean
feat, and rarely bodes well. Before polls closed across Scotland on 3 May 2007,
31 The Commission made a Statement at OJ 2007 L199/49 that it wil1 make a study, to be submitted to
the European Parhament and Council before the end of 2008, on "the specific problems resulting for
EU residents involved in road traffic accidents in a Member State other than the Nember State of their
habitual residence". This study will take account of the variation in levels of compensation awsarded to
victims of road traffic accidents in different Member States and \\ill pa\ e the wa sbr a Green Paper.
32 Byart 1(2).
* Thanks and apologies to Amy Winehouse for the subtitle.
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